The President above parties: a founding illusion of the Fifth Republic by Knapp, Andrew
 e-France, Volume 3, 2012        ISSN 1756-0535  
 
 
 
 
The President above Parties:  
a Founding Illusion of the Fifth Republic 
  
 
 
Andrew KNAPP 
University of Reading (UK) 
 
Max Weber famously wrote that the state, and its domination of civil 
society, may draw on three sources of legitimacy: the traditional 
authority of the ‘patriarch and the patrimonial prince’, the rational-
legal authority of rules and due process, and the ‘extraordinary and 
personal gift of grace (charisma).’ Charisma, he adds, may be 
‘exercised by the prophet or – in the field of politics – by the elected 
war lord, the plebiscitarian ruler, the great demagogue, or the political 
party leader.’1 A charismatic leader ‘holds his authority in virtue of a 
mission held to be incarnate in his person’; the structures of 
charismatic authority are born of ‘extraordinary situations of 
emergency and enthusiasm.’ Because the circumstances of its genesis 
are exceptional, however, ‘“Pure” charismatic domination is […] 
unstable’; it is all too easily overtaken by the ‘conditions of everyday 
life’, challenged by the question of the succession, and ‘fated to 
decline as permanent institutional structures increasingly develop.’2 
                                                     
1 Max Weber, ‘Politics as Vocation’, in From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, tr./ed. 
H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1948), pp. 77-
128; pp. 78-9. 
2 Max Weber, ‘The Nature of Charismatic Domination’, in Max Weber, Weber: 
Selections in Translation, ed. W.G. Runciman, tr. E. Matthews (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1978), pp. 232, 236, 238, 248. 
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Few democratic politicians correspond so closely to the Weberian 
profile of charismatic leadership as Charles de Gaulle. His own 
conviction of his charismatic status leaps out of the opening pages of 
his War Memoirs; the catastrophe of June 1940 gave him the chance 
to make it reality. Few heard his historic broadcast of 18 June calling 
on Frenchmen to continue the fight against Germany; fewer joined 
him in London. It was above all his conviction of his own personal 
mission to incarnate France that transformed his motley group of 
followers into a broad political movement commanding, by June 
1944, the support of all of France’s major pre-war parties, the internal 
Resistance, and some 400,000 (mostly colonial) troops. De Gaulle 
owed his position as the head of France’s first post-war government 
(the Provisional Government of the French Republic was declared on 
3 June 1944) to this record, to the acclamations of the crowds on his 
return to France (at Bayeux on 14 June, and above all in Paris on 26 
August), and to the tardy recognition of the Allies, accorded on 23 
October 1944. Only in November 1945 was his role given the official 
sanction of a newly-elected Constituent Assembly, a unanimous 
parliamentary vote of which he made so little case that he resigned 
barely two months later.  
De Gaulle never represented anything as banal as a parliamentary 
constituency. His return to power in June 1958 fell almost as far 
outside the routines of democratic politics as his record in 1940-46: 
President René Coty appointed him as the last Prime Minister of the 
Fourth Republic because politicians, the public, and an insurrectionary 
military viewed him as the only man who could solve France’s 
problem in Algeria. He asked for, and got, a mandate to give France a 
new Constitution; the Fifth Republic was approved by popular 
referendum in September 1958, and he was elected as its first present, 
by a college of some 90,000 local notables, that December. In fact he 
only ran (‘stood’ would be a more appropriate word) for election by 
universal suffrage once in a thirty-year political career, at the 
presidential election of December 1965: his other appeals to the voters 
– five of them – took the form of referendums: one in 1958, one in 
1961, two in 1962, and one in 1969. In each, he put his own leadership 
on the line, and when he lost the last of them, he announced his 
resignation within hours of the result. Over four decades later, the ‘de 
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Gaulle myth’ – constantly changing, but not so far fading – retains 
extraordinary power over the French political imagination.
3
 
The presidential election of 1965 was an essential moment in the 
theme of this paper, the ‘routinisation’ of de Gaulle’s charismatic 
authority, its slow mutation into a duller, more institutionalised, more 
rational-legal source of legitimacy. But the process extended across 
the whole of the presidency, and involved a complex series of 
interactions between the president himself, France’s parties, and the 
constitution of the Fifth Republic as it took shape in its first decade. 
The end product was the transformation of an institution, the 
presidency, conceived as an insurance against the domination of the 
state by political parties, into the major stake of party competition. 
This was one of de Gaulle’s most lasting legacies, and has structured 
French party politics ever since.  
The approach taken here is broadly chronological and draws 
heavily on the memories of actors such as Alain Peyrefitte, Pierre 
Lefranc, Robert Poujade, and Jacques Foccart. It covers the transition 
between the Fourth and Fifth Republics, the ‘second foundation’ of 
the Fifth Republic in the autumn of 1962, the impact of 1965, and the 
succession process when de Gaulle finally left the stage. 
 
Fourth to Fifth Republic 
 
De Gaulle had opposed the Fourth Republic even before its 
creation, sketching out his alternative vision at Bayeux, on 16 June 
1946, five months after his own resignation and in the middle of 
France’s post-war constitutional debate. At the heart of the Gaullist 
critique was the freedom the Fourth Republic accorded to political 
parties to control the French state. ‘We know only too well’, he 
thundered at Bayeux, ‘that once the danger [of German occupation] 
had passed, everything was handed over to the discretion of the 
parties.’ 4 Not that parties lacked a legitimacy of their own; it was 
simply that, in the Gaullist canon, they were doomed to represent 
parts of the nation, and thus to reproduce France’s deep, and 
damaging, social and political divisions. As long as parliament was 
the creature of the parties, and as long as the Prime Minister, the 
government, and the President of the Republic were the creatures of 
parliament, the parties would act as a screen between the French 
                                                     
3 S. Hazareesingh, In the Shadow of the General. Modern France and the Myth of de 
Gaulle (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012). 
4 Charles de Gaulle, Discours prononcé à Bayeux le 16 juin 1946, in Discours et 
Messages, ii, Paris, Plon 1970, p. 11. 
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people and their supreme executive authority (Figure 1). What looks 
to an Anglo-Saxon observer like a straightforward, if oversimplified, 
schema for a typical parliamentary democracy, was unacceptable to 
Gaullists because of its apparently proven incapacity to deal with 
major crises – the defeat of 1940, but also the insurrection of May 
1958 in Algiers. 
 
 
Figure 1: The Fourth Republic or le régime des partis 
 
 
 
Breaking with the ‘regime of parties’ was, then, an essential 
Gaullist aim after the General’s return to power. But parties could 
hardly be abolished in a modern democracy; indeed Article 4 of the 
new Constitution, promulgated on 4 October 1958, stated that 
‘Political parties and groups shall contribute to the exercise of 
suffrage. They shall be formed and carry on their activities freely. 
They shall respect the principles of national sovereignty and 
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democracy.’5 It was no more realistic to attempt to change the 
behaviour of parties; representing partial interests was in their nature. 
Rather, France’s institutions should constrain their sphere of action, 
and ensure, in a much reinforced presidency, a supreme authority who 
would be, in the words of the Bayeux speech, ‘above parties’ – and 
capable of by-passing them by appealing directly to the electorate.  
Figure 2, then, is a simplified representation of the Constitution 
of 1958. Parties, at the outset, were still expected to form a screen 
between voters and parliament. But the President, now elected not by 
the two houses of parliament but by an electoral college of 90,000, 
was freed from parliamentary control. And he was given important 
new powers. His appointment of the government would henceforth be 
without countersignature (of de Gaulle’s three prime ministers, the 
first, Michel Debré, was a seasoned parliamentarian; the second, 
Georges Pompidou, had never been elected to any office; the third, 
Maurice Couve de Murville, had won his first parliamentary election 
less than three weeks before his appointment). He had the right to 
dissolve parliament, again without countersignature. And he could 
engage in a direct dialogue with the voters by putting major 
institutional issues – ‘the organisation of the public authorities’, as 
well as treaties and issues relating to the rapidly-shrinking French 
Union – to referendum. The exercise of this right was, in principle, 
subject to checks and balances. A referendum could only be called on 
the proposal of the government or of both houses of parliament; and 
while it might be used as part of a process of constitutional 
amendment, this could only occur (under Article 89) after both houses 
of parliament had voted on an identical text. De Gaulle, nevertheless, 
made full use of the referendum and paid little attention to such 
checks and balances, treating the proposal of the government as a 
formality and, in 1962, ignoring the requirement of a parliamentary 
vote on a constitutional amendment. The main thing was the ability of 
president and people to connect. Personally aloof but still politically 
charismatic, he also took care to maintain direct, day-by-day contacts 
with the French through press conferences, television and radio 
speeches, and the walkabouts – the ‘plebiscite every day’6 – that were 
the despair of his security personnel.  
                                                     
5
 ‘Les partis et groupements politiques concourent à l'expression du suffrage. 
Ils se forment et exercent leur activité librement. Ils doivent respecter les 
principes de la souveraineté nationale et de la démocratie.’ (Constitution of 
the Fifth French Republic, Article 4. 
6 Hazareesingh, In the Shadow of the General, p. 67. 
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The new presidency was complemented by a new set of 
relationships between parliament and the government. Parliament 
remained, of course, the main (though not the only) source of 
recruitment for ministers; it retained its right to force the government 
to resign, through a vote of censure of an absolute majority of its  
 
Figure 2: The Fifth Republic of 1958 
 
 
 
members, a tool that ensured that no government could flagrantly defy  
its wishes. At the same time, however, the government, appointed by 
the president, was no longer under any obligation (as it had been 
under Article 45 of the Constitution of the Fourth Republic) to seek 
the confidence of parliament before taking office; and it disposed of a 
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formidable battery of new measures available to get its own agenda 
through, and to survive what was still expected to be a legislature 
dominated by fractious and divided parties.  
Within this schema, the role of the Gaullist party, the Union pour 
la Nouvelle République (UNR) remained ambiguous. Even with 
Gaullist parties, de Gaulle’s earlier experiences had been unhappy: the 
Rassemblement du Peuple Français (RPF), launched by him in the 
spring of 1947 with the purpose of bringing the Fourth Republic down 
and himself back to office, failed and was disowned by him in 1953. 
The UNR had no official backing from the General. ‘Everyone will 
understand’, said de Gaulle on 23 October 1958, during the campaign 
for the first legislative elections of the Fifth Republic, ‘that I have no 
wish to, that I cannot, be directly involved in this competition […] 
This impartiality compels me to require that my name, even in the 
form of an adjective, should not be used as a label by any group or by 
any candidate.’7  
This official version should not, quite, be taken at face value. De 
Gaulle was soon intervening actively, if very discreetly, in the life of 
the UNR. His interventions concerned both the party’s structure and 
its strategy: he had no wish either to see the UNR elect a party 
president – a title too redolent of authority – or to allow it, as some 
party leaders such as Jacques Soustelle wished, to seek allies among 
the Algérie Française ultras like André Morice, Roger Duchet, or 
Georges Bidault. The UNR’s secretary-general, Albin Chalandon, 
resumed the position by observing that if the UNR was de Gaulle’s 
creature, he was not the UNR’s; he could never, as a national arbiter, 
shut himself within the confines of a single party; and the party was 
therefore in the position where it must constantly serve the General 
without ever being directly under his command.
8
  
De Gaulle’s early relationship with the UNR, indeed, was a 
bundle of negatives unusual for a democratic political leader. He did 
not wish it to become another mass organisation as the RPF had 
fleetingly been; he certainly did not wish to become an Algérie 
Française bastion; he never had any form of direct or open contact 
with ‘his’ party, but always acted through members of the Gaullist 
                                                     
7 Charles de Gaulle, Conférence de presse du 23 octobre 1958, in Discours et 
messages, III, p.52. (‘Tout le monde comprend que je ne veuille, que je ne puisse pas 
me mêler d’une manière directe à cette compétition … Cette impartialité m’oblige à 
tenir essentiellement à ce que mon nom, même sous la forme d’un adjectif, ne soit pas 
utilisé dans le titre d’aucun groupe et d’aucun candidat.’) 
8 Jean Charlot, L’UNR: étude du pouvoir au sein d’un parti politique, Paris, Armand 
Colin, 1967, p. 255. 
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inner circle such as Jacques Foccart (above all), Pierre Lefranc, 
Jacques Richard, or Olivier Guichard. He did not wish to know how 
the UNR chose its candidates.
9
 And he did not believe that the UNR 
would win more than a handful of seats in 1958 (even if views of how 
well he wanted the UNR to do vary). De Gaulle the charismatic leader 
remained deeply reluctant to use the most basic tool of a democratic 
politician, party leadership. 
 
The Fifth Republic refounded: Autumn 1962 
 
The ambiguity in relations between the president and his party 
was partly, but only partly, lifted with the ‘second foundation’ of the 
Fifth Republic in the autumn of 1962. This was a three-month political 
drama which opened with de Gaulle’s announcement of a referendum 
on a constitutional amendment to allow the election of the president 
by direct universal suffrage – a referendum that was unconstitutional 
as parliament had not had the opportunity to vote on the amendment, 
which it would have opposed. The drama escalated with the only 
successful vote of censure by the National Assembly against a 
government of the Fifth Republic, continued with the dissolution of 
parliament, and concluded with a successful referendum and the return 
of a Gaullist-led parliamentary majority. The new republic thereby 
received two of its essential features: a directly-elected presidency, 
and a stable majority coalition in the National Assembly. De Gaulle 
was explicit about the need for the former: the sanction of universal 
suffrage would be required for any possible successor, because no 
other possible candidate could possess de Gaulle’s unique historic 
stature. Altogether less expected was the crystallisation of a stable 
majority; less so still, by the Gaullists at least, the unintended 
consequence of the constitutional reform – an immediate 
rapprochement between the presidency and party competition. 
De Gaulle took a step into the arena of party politics because he 
was disappointed with the referendum result of 28 October and 
worried by its implications for the parliamentary elections of 18-25 
November. Sixty-two per cent of valid voters cast said Yes to the 
direct election of the president; but that was only 47 per cent of 
registered voters, prompting the general to forecast that, half disowned 
                                                     
9 Alain Peyrefitte, C’était de Gaulle, I, Paris, Éditions de Fallois / Fayard, 1994, p. 
266. 
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by the referendum, he would be completely so by the elections.
10
 This 
pessimism reshaped his relationship with the UNR, whose rise was 
actively sanctioned, even sought, by the president, albeit implicitly: on 
7 November 1962, for example, he expressed the wish that the verdict 
of the second vote would not contradict the result of the first.
11
  
These words were confirmed by (mostly) covert acts. In 1962 de 
Gaulle took a direct interest, as he had not in 1958, in the selection of 
UNR candidates; he helped choose the party’s election slogan (Faites 
respecter votre oui); he showed warm approval of those of his 
ministers, appointed from outside parliament, who now ran in 
constituencies; he asked Lefranc, a Gaullist since 1940, active within 
the post-war RPF but outside electoral politics thereafter, to organise a 
merger between the UNR and the separate movement of left-wing 
Gaullists, the Union Démocratique du Travail. Jacques Foccart, a 
Gaullist stalwart from the Resistance years with strong connections to 
the secret services, who became the President’s adviser for African 
affairs (and the organiser of France’s close relations with the heads of 
newly-independent Francophone African states) from 1958, now took 
on an equivalent liaison role for his relations with the UNR. By the 
time of the municipal elections of March 1965, Foccart observed that 
de Gaulle ‘proclaimed his lack of interest in the elections, but spoke to 
me about them at length from the beginning of the year, and asked me 
almost every evening how particular local situations were developing. 
In reality, he followed all elections, even by-elections, very closely. 
He had visited all the major towns of France and many of the smaller 
ones, he knew the mayor and the notables and had formed a clear idea 
of the value of each of them. There was nothing he did not know 
about France’s electoral geography.’ And ‘I kept the General informed 
of developments in each major constituency, and of the pressures 
needed to make some potential candidates run, and to secure the 
withdrawal of others. In a few cases, though very rare ones, and with 
considerable misgivings, the General allowed me to indicate his 
wishes to obtain a change of mind from a potential candidate’.12 
                                                     
10 Peyrefitte, C’était de Gaulle, I, p. 263. 
11 Charles de Gaulle, Discours du 7 novembre 1962, in Discours et messages, IV, p. 44 
(‘Les 18 et 25 novembre, vous allez élire les députés. Ah! puissiez-vous faire en sorte 
que cette deuxième consultation n’aille pas à l’encontre de la première !’). The 
televised version is on http://www.ina.fr/politique/allocutions-
discours/video/CAF89051357/discours-du-general-de-gaulle-du-07-11-1962.fr.html. 
12 Jacques Foccart, Journal de l’Élysée, I, Tous les soirs avec le Général de Gaulle, 
Paris, Fayard/JeuneAfrique, 1998, p. 377. (‘Il affichait son désintérêt [pour les 
élections municipales], mais il m’en parlait abondamment presque tous les soirs 
depuis le début de l’année, m’interrogeant sur les détails de l’évolution des situations 
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Figure 3 (see next page) attempts to represent this new state of 
affairs. It shows, in the first place, a clear separation, within the 
country and within Parliament, between the parties of the majority and 
those of the opposition. The government could henceforth normally 
count on the support of the majority (the UNR-UDT, and the small 
group of Républicains Indépendants led by the young Finance 
Minister Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, conservatives within the ruling 
coalition but outside the Gaullist party) and expect the opposition to 
oppose, albeit rather ineffectively. The opposition was, for the 
moment, more dispersed than the majority, between the Communists, 
the Socialists, and the Centrists. Secondly, the links between the 
president and the majority were reinforced, to the point where a real 
separation between the two as might have been imagined at the 
beginning of the Republic was no longer an option. As Georges 
Pompidou, the Prime Minister appointed by de Gaulle after the end of 
the Algerian war, observed to Alain Peyrefitte, de Gaulle’s 
Information Minister and posthumous chronicler, ‘The President 
cannot exercise his functions without the support of a parliamentary 
majority. The General needs to give up his unanimist utopia. Of 
course he is the president of all the French, but thanks to a majority 
and in spite of a minority.’13 
The mutual dependence between the president and the majority 
was certainly far from total. Even within the Gaullist-led coalition 
there were aspirations to greater independence from an early stage, not 
least from the Giscardians. De Gaulle himself, more importantly, still 
held to his idea of a direct dialogue between the head of state and the 
nation, over the heads of the parties. His preparation of the 1965 
__________ 
 
locales. En réalité, il suivait très attentivement toutes les élections, même partielles. Il 
avait visité toutes les grandes villes et beaucoup de plus petites, il connaissait les 
maires, les notables, et il s’était fair une idée sur la valeur des uns et des autres. … Il 
n’ignorait rien de la géographie électorale.’ And ‘Je tenais le Général informé de 
l’évolution dans chaque circonscription importante, des pressions qu’il nous fallait 
exercer sur les uns pour qu’ils se présentent et sur les autres pour qu’ils retirent leur 
candidature. Dans certains cas, mais très rares, et avec beaucoup de réticence, le 
Général acceptait que je fasse état de son souhait pour obtenir un changement 
d’attitude de la part d’un candidat potentiel.’ 
13 Peyrefitte, C’était de Gaulle, I, p.267. (Le Président ne peut pas exercer ses 
fonctions s’il n’a pas une majorité pour le soutenir. Le Général doit renoncer à son 
utopie unanimiste. Bien sûr, il est le Président de tous les Français, mais grâce à une 
majorité et malgré une minorité.’) 
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presidential election campaign is illustrative of this. He kept the voters 
guessing about his candidacy until 4 November, just a month before 
the first ballot, and failed to give the teasing signals common to 
most incumbent candidates. He left the organisation of his 
‘campaign’, such as it was, not to the UNR, but to the 
Association for Support of the Action of General de Gaulle, a small 
 
 
Figure 3: The Fifth Republic post-1962 
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produce no campaign material, and had to find an agent in each 
département who was not a member of the UNR.
14
 Odd though de 
Gaulle’s behaviour may appear within a party democracy, it seems 
that it chimed with the views of most of the French: a poll in 
November 1965 indicated that 56 per cent of respondents wanted the 
president to stay out of party politics.
15
 
 
De Gaulle’s second term, 1965–69 
 
If the poll appeared to back de Gaulle’s approach, the same could 
hardly be said of the first-ballot result. Forty-four per cent against five 
opponents, though excellent for a politician, appeared mediocre for a 
living legend. There followed a radical change of strategy between 
ballots, with de Gaulle allowing for the second what he had refused 
for the first: television interviews (which he did with great success), 
and above all the clear support of the UNR, if not quite as a 
‘president’s party’, at least as a logistical support. As Peyrefitte 
observed,  
 
De Gaulle had believed – as I had, and we were both 
wrong – that the fact of being elected by universal 
suffrage, and, for him, of being a historic figure, made a 
party unnecessary for the president. The 1965 election 
opened his eyes. It was the end of a myth according to 
which the president and the people maintained a 
continuous dialogue, beyond parties, which had been 
considered as intermediate interests capable of perverting 
the constitution.
16
 
                                                     
14 Pierre Lefranc, Avec de Gaulle: 25 ans avec le général de Gaulle, Paris, Plon 
(collection Presses Pocket), 1989 (première édition Avec qui vous savez, Paris, Plon, 
1979), p. 298. 
15 Sondages (IFOP), 1965. 
16 Alain Peyrefitte interview, 10 July 1991, quoted in Andrew Knapp, Gaullisme since 
de Gaulle, Aldershot, Dartmouth Publishing, 1994, p. 195. (‘De Gaulle a cru — 
comme moi, et nous avions tous les deux tort — que le fait d’être élu au suffrage 
universel, et, pour lui, d’être un personnage historique, rendaient un parti accessoire 
pour le président. En 1965, il s’était rendu compte que c’était nécessaire. Cette 
élection lui a ouvert les yeux. C’était la mort d’un mythe, dans lequel nous avons 
vécu, selon lequel le président et le peuple entretenaient un dialogue continu, au-delà 
des partis, considérés comme des intérêts intermédiaires qui risquaient de détourner la 
Constitution le moment venu.’) 
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The election of 1965, then, was a historic turning-point, and 
opened a new phase in the institutional practice of the Fifth Republic. 
This would be shaped, not only by the lessons of the presidential 
election, but also by the parliamentary elections due for March 1967. 
De Gaulle, it is true, could make light of the importance of the need 
for a presidential majority, as when, after the 1967 elections were won 
by a whisker, he remarked to Peyrefitte ‘So you’ve won your 
elections! Pity! We might have had the chance to govern with the 
Constitution!’ 17 In fact, not only the President but also the Prime 
Minister were increasingly interested in the development of the UNR; 
their interventionism reinforced the links of mutual dependence.  
Such links were not, it is true, readily admitted by the President. 
As Robert Poujade, the party’s secretary-general from 1968 to 1971, 
later recalled,  
 
The General had a sort of detached affection, and a 
limited esteem, for the [Gaullist] movement. While he 
did not – quite – place it in the category of useless 
committees, he thought of it as a tenuous emanation of 
himself, which owed its existence to him, and which 
ought to be clear on this point.
18
 
 
Whatever his feigned detachment, and even disdain, de Gaulle 
had been particularly active in the party’s campaign and pre-campaign 
in 1967. According to Lefranc, he had insisted that voters should be 
able to choose a UNR candidate in every constituency (which meant 
fewer free runs to Giscardians); and he pressed the ‘technical’ 
ministers appointed from outside parliament to seek a constituency.
19
 
Foccart, for his part, confirms that the General concerned himself in 
detail, and almost daily, with candidacies in the last quarter of 1966.
20
 
                                                     
17 Alain Peyrefitte, C’était de Gaulle, III, Paris, Éditions de Fallois / Fayard, 2000, p. 
230. (‘Alors, vous les avez gagnées, vos élections ! C’est dommage ! On aurait vu 
comment on peut gouverner avec la Constitution !’). 
18 Robert Poujade, Avec de Gaulle et Pompidou. Mémoires (Paris: Éditions de 
l’Archipel, 2011), p. 82. (‘Le Général avait une sorte d’affection distanciée et une 
considération en fait limitée pour le mouvement. S’il ne le rangeait pas tout à fait dans 
la catégorie de comités Théodule, il le réduisait dans son esprit à une émanation ténue 
de lui-même, qui n’avait de vraie réalité que par lui et qui devait s’en persuader.’) 
19 Lefranc, Avec de Gaulle, pp. 252, 320. 
20 Foccart, Journal de l’Élysée, I, pp. 481–536. For example, de Gaulle vetoed the 
candidacy of Michel de Camaret in the Breton city of Quimper, despite de Camaret’s 
excellent Free French record, because was a divorcee and in Quimper, ‘the priests’ 
word is law’ (p. 511). 
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Foccart also, of course, consulted him on choices for the party 
leadership.
 21
 In speeches, moreover, he underlined the dangers of an 
eventual ‘cohabitation’ with the Left during the election campaign, on 
4 March 1967 cohabitation,
22
, and he recognised, albeit obliquely, his 
personal link with the party during a press conference on 27 
November.
23
  
But de Gaulle’s party activity was paralleled by an increasingly 
tight day-to-day control on the party, and on the majority, by the 
Prime Minister, Georges Pompidou, in the aftermath of the 
presidential election. Pompidou chaired both the political council of 
the UNR and the bureau of its parliamentary group on 13 January 
1966. The following May, he set up an Action Committee for the Fifth 
Republic aimed at smoothing out differences between the UNR 
(especially its left wing) and the Républicains Indépendants. In the 
autumn, he brought the UNR’s leaders together at the residence of the 
president of the National Assembly, Jacques Chaban-Delmas, to 
discuss the party’s role after de Gaulle’s departure from the scene. He 
reminded them that no party would be able to live off the General’s 
reputation in the near future, and proposed the replacement of the 
outgoing secretary-general, Jacques Baumel, by a college of five joint 
secretaries, whose work would be co-ordinated from within the 
government. It was Pompidou, finally, who organised the party 
conference in November 1967 at Lille, and gave it a strong theme of 
renewal and rejuvenation.
24
 
These initiatives responded to two main motivations on 
Pompidou’s part: not only to ensure victory at the 1967 parliamentary 
elections, but also to make the UNR the future instrument of his own 
presidential candidacy. From the moment of de Gaulle’s re-election, at 
the age of 75, for a second seven-year term, in December 1965, it was 
entirely foreseeable that the party would never again be called on to 
support the General directly and in person. Its survival, and that of its 
leaders, depended not only upon successful parliamentary elections 
                                                     
21 Foccart, Journal de l’Élysée, I, p. 778. 
22 Charles de Gaulle, Discours et messages, IV, Paris, Plon, 1970, pp. 147–9. 
23 Charles de Gaulle, Discours et messages, IV, Paris, Plon, 1970, p. 247. 
24 On the Lille conference, see especially Jean Charlot, ‘L’après-gaullisme’, Revue 
Française de Science Politique, 18.1, February 1968, pp. 68–76, and Jean Charlot, 
The Gaullist Phenomenon, London, George Allen and Unwin, 1971, pp. 93–4. 
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but on a future presidential election for which Pompidou could 
reasonably consider himself the best-placed candidate.
25
  
These parallel developments are represented in Figure 4: a 
stronger role for the president in candidate selection, but also the 
beginnings of a party role in the election of the president; and a        
 
Figure 4: The Fifth Republic 1965-69 
 
  
greater degree of interventionism by the prime minister in party 
affairs.  These developments, it should be added, took place in a 
context of growing competition between President and Prime 
Minister. To a certain degree, it is hardly surprising that the president 
                                                     
25 Lefranc, in Avec de Gaulle (p. 297) claims that this process was initiated in the 
autumn of 1965, when Pompidou was preparing to run himself if de Gaulle did not. 
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and the prime minister should each concern themselves with the main 
party of the majority, the president for strategic issues (including 
candidate selection) and the prime minister for day-to-day ones. But 
from 1965, and above all from 1967, relations between de Gaulle and 
Pompidou deteriorated. In public policy terms, this crystallised around 
the issue of ‘participation’, de Gaulle’s ambition to defuse class 
conflict in France by promoting greater industrial democracy and 
workers’ profit-sharing. De Gaulle found Pompidou distinctly luke-
warm towards any such reform; the Prime Minister was indeed 
sceptical towards what he saw as setting up a régime d’assemblée on 
France’s shopfloors.26 But the differences between the two men 
extended to the issue of who should control the Gaullist party. From 
the moment when the party had become a precious source of support, 
as it did from 1965, it inevitably became an asset and subject to 
disputed claims. Thus de Gaulle could observe to Foccart in February 
1966 that ‘Pompidou is wrong to pose as head of the majority. The 
majority is formed up around me.’27 Equally, it appears likely that 
Pompidou’s efforts to set up a new system to finance the UNR that 
would be more professionalised, more predictable, and less dependent 
on the secret services, was not wholly to de Gaulle’s liking.28  
Pulled between de Gaulle and Pompidou, the UNR of the late 
1960s, relaunched as the Union des Démocrates pour la V
e
 
République (UDV
e
) in 1967, and the Union pour la Défense de la 
République (UDR) in 1968), suffered, in Poujade’s words, from a 
certain ‘incapacity to exist’ independently of the executive.29 And 
when it came to mobilising the conservative riposte on the streets to 
the ‘events’ of May 1968, the Comités de Défense de la République, 
organised by Lefranc and Foccart, were, at the very least, a necessary 
complement to the Gaullist party proper.
30
 It was nevertheless the 
party that benefited the most, both in a landslide victory at the 
parliamentary elections of June 1968 (when the UDR won the first 
single-party majority in French republican history) and in a wave of 
                                                     
26 Georges Pompidou, Pour rétablir une vérité, Paris, Flammarion, 1982, p. 204. 
27 Foccart, Journal de l’Élysée, I, p. 361. (‘Pompidou a tort de se poser en chef de la 
majorité. La majorité, c’est autour de moi qu’elle se fait.’) 
28 Private sources (Confédération Nationale du Patronat Français). Pompidou’s 
proximity to French business, established during his years at Rothschild’s Bank, was 
far greater than de Gaulle’s – and hardly disposed him favourably to ‘participation’.   
29 See Charlot, The Gaullist Phenomenon, p. 127. 
30 See Lefranc, Avec de Gaulle, p. 363; Poujade, Avec de Gaulle et Pompidou, p. 141. 
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new members. The figure of perhaps 160,000 was very high for a 
French right-wing party and perhaps twice the pre-1968 level; the 
UDR’s best recruiting sergeants were not Pompidou or Poujade or de 
Gaulle, but the leftist leaders Daniel Cohn-Bendit or Alain Geismar, 
or the trade union leader Georges Séguy, or the Communist Party 
chief Waldeck Rochet.
31
 
 
The party and the presidential succession, 1968-9 
 
Between de Gaulle and ‘his’ party, however, the triumph of June 
1968 produced something close to a separation. De Gaulle himself 
would say of the 1968 National Assembly that ‘it’s a PSF chamber 
[referring to the far right-wing Parti Social Français of pre-war days]; 
I’m going to make them apply PSU policies [referring to the Parti 
Socialiste Unifié, a left-wing ginger group active in the events of 
May].’32 De Gaulle, now an old man in a hurry, saw May 1968 as a 
clear warning that France needed more reforms; the new majority saw 
their electoral victory as an invitation to clamp down on leftists by all 
means. De Gaulle knew that the conservative victory owed at least as 
much to Pompidou as to him.
33
 Above all, he knew that the direct 
dialogue with the people of France that was central to his conception 
of the presidential function had been interrupted – and had to be re-
established if he was to remain in office. This prompted the 
referendum of 27 April 1969, in principle about reforms to the Senate 
and to the regions, but also about whether de Gaulle should remain 
president. Its organisation was entrusted to Pompidou’s successor as 
prime minister, Maurice Couve de Murville, and to his staff, who did 
not display any excessive energy in discharging their duties. For many 
UDR voters and even activists, there was now an attractive alternative 
to de Gaulle in Georges Pompidou, who had emerged much reinforced 
from the events of May, and who had made clear his own presidential 
aspirations in a press interview in January 1969.
34
 Lefranc’s verdict on 
the party’s campaign, though exaggerated, had a grain of truth: ‘It was 
pretty obvious to everyone that the UDR and its leaders did not show 
any great ardour in their task. The result was de Gaulle’s referendum 
                                                     
31 Figures from Charlot, The Gaullist Phenomenon, p. 131. 
32 Jean Lacouture, De Gaulle, III, Paris, Le Seuil, 1990, p. 726. (‘C’est une chambre 
PSF; je lui ferai faire une politique PSU.’) 
33 Lacouture, De Gaulle, III, p. 726. 
34 Poujade, Avec de Gaulle et Pompidou, pp. 169-172. 
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defeat and immediate resignation, and the presidential election of 
1969.’35 
 
Figure 5: The Fifth Republic from 1969 
 
 
That contest saw the party, in the shape of its historic ‘barons’, 
take on a role, albeit still a weakly institutionalised one, in the 
                                                     
35 Lacouture, De Gaulle, III, Paris, Le Seuil, 1990, p. 726. (‘Il nous fut, comme à tout 
le monde, facile de constater que l’UDR et ses cadres ne faisaient pas preuve d’une 
grande ardeur. Et c’est la défaite et le scrutin présidentiel de 1969.’) Poujade, as UDR 
secretary-general, would write later that the party had campaigned actively – but that 
he himself had reservations about the complex, inaccessible character of the reform 
proposed at the referendum (Poujade, Avec de Gaulle et Pompidou, 171). 
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nomination of the presidential candidate. On 28 April, just twelve 
hours after the General’s resignation, the barons met for lunch and 
agreed on Pompidou’s candidacy. Pompidou made an official 
declaration of his candidacy the following day at 9.30, and was 
officially adopted as the party’s candidate that afternoon by the 
UDR’s executive bureau. He then went on to negotiate the support of 
a certain number of conservative centrists, notably by promising to 
reverse de Gaulle’s veto on UK entry into the EEC, to help transform 
de Gaulle’s referendum defeat into a Gaullist electoral victory. Each 
of these events confirmed the role that parties would play in 
relationships between voters and the president, represented in the final 
chart (Figure 5). And an enhanced role for parties left little space for 
charismatic leadership. Pompidou, though he was not primarily a 
party man (and indeed did not command the total loyalty of the party 
as president), was still a party choice; among the many personal 
attributes of this intelligent conservative, charisma was not one. 
 
Conclusion 
 
However logical and desirable a president above parties may 
have seemed in 1958, when the president was de Gaulle and where 
nothing short of a broad cross-party consensus had a chance of settling 
the Algerian issue, the Gaullist ideal proved a chimera. Even the 
General needed the backing of a party from an early stage; the 
Gaullists’ preferred labels for their organisations, such as ‘Union’, 
‘Rally’, or ‘Movement’, were skimpy fig-leaves that did little to 
conceal their partisan reality. All de Gaulle’s successors in the 
presidency have needed a major party to reach the Élysée: the 
elimination of Raymond Barre by Jacques Chirac in 1988, that of 
Édouard Balladur by Chirac en 1995, or, finally, that of Ségolène 
Royal by Nicolas Sarkozy in 2007 were all due, in different ways, to 
the failure of the unsuccessful candidates to mobilise a major party 
behind them. Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, elected in 1974 with only the 
small Républicains Indépendants group behind him, appears as the 
exception who proved the rule: the Left was still (just) disqualified in 
1974 by the strength of the Communists, and Giscard’s Gaullist 
competitors were still divided and traumatised by the Pompidou’s 
death in office. The end of the de Gaulle presidency also established a 
second pattern that would reappear later, that of the lame-duck 
president, too old or too ill, or both, to aspire to a further term: 
Pompidou in 1973, Mitterrand from 1988, Chirac from 2002. This 
phenomenon will become generalised, though driven by institutions 
not by human frailty, with the advent of the two-term limit on the 
presidency under the constitutional reform package voted in 2008. 
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The president above parties has nevertheless cast a long shadow. 
Although successful candidates owe their position more to party 
support than to personal charisma, presidents in power have always 
felt obliged to resign their party functions the better to appear as 
presidents of all the French. At the same time, however, they have 
always felt an imperative need to retain the support of a party to face 
future electoral contests, whether presidential, legislative, regional, or 
local. The result has been a system in which the presidential party is 
directed from the shadows by a president who is no longer, officially, 
a party leader: an ambiguity that is not the most positive legacy of de 
Gaulle’s presidency. 
 
